Discrimination of women in the labor market requires appropriate policy interventions. Armative action policies typically advocate the introduction of an employment quota uniformly applied to all rms. In a heterogeneous labor market such a policy may yield avoidable welfare losses. We propose a tradable employment quota showing its eects on wages, employment and welfare in a labor market with search frictions and taste discrimination. A tradable employment quota occurs to be a viable alternative yielding superior labor market outcomes.
Introduction
Armative action policies very often take the form of employment quotas.
Norway introduced a quota in 2003, and France, Iceland, and Spain have mandatory boardroom gender quotas forcing rms to have boards with 40% women by the years 2017, 2013, and 2015, respectively. Only recently, the European Parliament passed a proposal by the European Commission to break the glass ceiling. According to this envisaged bill, European rms have to appoint female directors in order to make supervisory boards two-fths female by 2020.
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As it is very likely that a uniform employment quota imposes larger adjustment costs on some rms than on others the question arises whether the goal of paving the way for more female employment can be achieved at lower costs. In particular, as the size of women's labor supply is heterogeneous across occupations, sectors, and regions, some of the rms forced to fulll a xed quota will nd it more dicult to hire women who match the vacancies than others. A more exible instrument is called for that does not compromise on the overall goal of achieving a certain share of female employment.
Such an instrument should allow rms to fall short of the quota if costs of compliance would become unreasonable, while allowing others to gain from employing relatively more women.
In this article we propose and analyze the labor market eects of a tradable employment quota. Borrowing from the experience with environmental regulation policies to combat excessive carbon dioxide emissions, we suggest to implement a mechanism that eciently achieves a xed share of women working in relation to men. The idea is to issue permits to rms that give them the right to employ men and make these permits tradable. With such an armative action policy rms would only be allowed to employ men up to a number that matches the stock of permits that they hold. As a particular rm would want to employ an additional man it would only be able to do so by purchasing an additional employment right. Firms being in excess of permits because they nd it more protable to employ a woman than to hold one of the permits will want to sell this right. Trading of permits between those rms that want to buy and those rms willing to sell would yield a market price of a permit reecting the protability of employing an additional man. While the overall supply of permits of an issuing body would determine the share of female employment in the economy, single rms could adjust more exibly and still comply.
On the backdrop of the recent policy initiatives to install board quotas for 1 See the European Commission Database on Women and Men in Decision Making. women, Table 1 assembles shares of female board memberships. With 16% the U.S. and the 27 (by 2007) EU member states fare equally in terms of female representation on rm boards. Japan, as another major industrialized country, has only 1% women on rm boards. A more closer look into single European countries reveals a large dispersion of female representation. In the three countries with the largest representation almost every third member is female, a share which, however, still falls short of Norway where a quota was introduced by 2003 already, forcing rms to comply by 2008. In the European countries that do worst not even every tenth position is held by a woman.
Interestingly, the countries doing relatively well in terms of female board membership hardly have women leading the board or being a CEO. Data for Germany allows for a closer look into the within country distribution of female representation. Again, we nd a large variance between rms.
Among the companies listed in the DAX (the major German stock market index), seven women serve on the board of Henkel which is composed of 16 members, while no woman is serving on the board of Fresenius (a medical care company).
The introduction of a female board quota in Norway constituted a natural experiment that allowed for an analysis of rm reactions and their consequences more closely. At the time the law was introduced only 9% of women were on the boards of Norwegian rms. A legislated quota of 40% imposed a major change on the composition of Norwegian rm boards. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) use the pre-quota female representation across rms as an instrument for the changes of boards that followed the quota. For the days around the announcement of the law they nd that stock returns fell by 3.52% for those rms with no female representation compared to rms that had at least one woman on the board. For the longer term, they estimate a decline in Tobin's Q of 12.4% as a response to a 10% forced increase in women representation on the boards. Overall they conclude that the constraint imposed had a large negative impact on rm value driven by the reorganizations of the boards. Drawing on the same policy change, Bohren and Staubo (2013) nd that half of the rms that would have been aected by the gender quota chose to exit into another organizational form, thus avoiding exposition to the law. Also this piece of evidence suggests, at least indirectly, substantial costs of compliance that possibly could be diminished with a system of tradable permits to employ men.
In order to study whether a tradable emplyoment quota is a feasible armative action policy and what labor market eects would possibly unfold we build an agent-based simulation model of the labor market and the market Ahern and Dittmar (2012, p.143) .
for permits. We study a labor market with a set of rms being allocated to multiple sectors. A fraction of the rms is characterized by taste discrimination against women as proposed by Becker (1957) . The remaining fraction of rms is indierent between men and women. Workers have sector specic skills meaning that their productivity does not fully unfold if they work in a sector that requires dierent skills than the ones embodied. Firms post vacancies to which workers apply and are matched. In this framework we study the eects of a tradable as opposed to a non-tradable employment quota on welfare and various other labor market indicators. Our main nding is that a tradable employment quota fares better in a heterogeneous labor market were rms are facing sectorally dierentiated levels of female labor supply.
We use an agent-based model to analyze whether a permit solution may
actually work and what labor market eects potentially emerge. Evaluating labor market policies using agent-based models has been suggested by Freeman (1998) already some time ago. Generally speaking an agent-based approach suits well for analyzing problems characterized by interacting heterogeneous agents. Moreover, agent-based modeling allows for a relatively detailed implementation of institutional arrangements. As we build a model with a sectoral structure hosting workers of dierent skill types to be employed by rms that may discriminate against women and, furthermore, will augment the labor market with a permit trading system, the agent-based approach seems to suit well for our purposes. Our approach may also be subsumed under what Roth (2002 Roth ( , p.1341 called design economics where he argues that computational techniques should be seen as complementarity to other tools applied to studying and designing markets, namely game-theory.
One of the earliest attempts to analyze the eects of labor market institutions in an agent-based model can be found in Bergmann (1990) . Others followed, with Tesfatsion (2001) working on wage setting or Neugart (2008) looking into training policies. Those and other contributions are surveyed in Neugart and Richiardi (2014) .
Building a computational model we touch upon various strands of the literature. Our theoretical explanation of men and women being treated dierently draws on taste discrimination (Becker, 1957) . The alternative explanation is statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972) . Empirical work long evolved separately along these two explanations (Guryan and Charles, 2013) . Only in recent years eorts have been made to test taste based explanations of discrimination against explanations pointing at statistical discrimination (See, e.g., Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Knowles et al., 2001) . The jury still seems to be out and we do not make an attempt to resolve the issue here. There is also no particular reason, why we chose a model of taste discrimation. At this point, all that we need is some sort of discriminatory behavior as a starting point to analyze the two armative action policies in comparison. Welch (1976) was probably among the rst dealing with armative action policies from a theoretical point of view. Equal employment opportunities as one proliferation of armative action policies have been studied in the framework of a search and matching model of the labor market by Kaas and Lu (2010) . They nd that if an imperfectly monitored equal employment opportunity legislation is combined with an equal pay obligation inequality increases. 2 Contrary to them we do not look into a xed quota but a tradable one.
While tradable permits have gained widespread attention in the area of environmental policies 3 , there is little to no application in the area of labor market policies. 4 This contribution may be seen as a rst step into the analysis of such kind of armative action policies. Our starting point is a heterogenous labor market where lack of appropriate skills in certain segments may cause considerable adjustment costs following the introduction of a uniform quota. Thus, once more, it underscores the importance of a better understanding of the reasons why women do not make it into certain (and well paid) segments of the labor market such as top-level management positions (Bertrand et al., 2010) .
In the following Section 2 we lay out our model and introduce the reader to the two armative action policies we are going to compare. After having described the parametrization and the simulation set-up in Section 3, we discuss labor market outcomes in a baseline specication of our model without policies in Section 4. The main purpose of this Section is to reveal the properties of our simulation model and put these into relation to the ndings of the existing literature on labor market models with taste discrimination. Section 5 studies the eects of a tradable employment quota in comparison with a non-tradable quota on welfare and other labor market indicators and reports on the results of various robustness tests. In the last section we conclude and point towards desirable extensions of the current work.
2 Other contributions looking into the labor market consequences of equal pay legislation are Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) ; Coate and Loury (1993) ; Kaas (2009) . Further search and matching models with taste discrimination but without policy analyses can be found in Black (1995) We consider two armative action policies. Under a non-tradable employment quota every rm is allowed to only employ a share of men that does not exceed the quota. Alternatively, we implement a tradable quota issuing permits that give a rm the right to employ a man. The permit market is modeled as a central market maker to whom each individual rm submits its individual supply and demand schedule of permits. The central market maker aggregates these bids and asks up, and determines the market clearing price at which the permits are reallocated.
Labor market environment
We consider a partial labor market where rms' labor demand is derived from aggregate product demand. Firms reside in S sectors. Workers are equipped with sector specic skills. A worker employed at a rm in a sector with her specic skills unfolds full productivity A. Worker specic productivity declines as she is employed in a more distant sector. Sectors are allocated on a Salop circle, i.e., a worker's productivity with specic skills in sector k, working in sector s follows
with 0 < a < 1, k = 1, ..., K, and s = 1, ..., S. As there are as many skill types as sectors we have K = S. Full productivity A is suciently large so that a worker's productivity never becomes negative.
Agents

Workers
The xed total labor supply of size I can be decomposed into of a fraction (1 − σ) of male workers and a fraction σ of female workers. A worker i has an individual reservation wage w r i that is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0, A].
Workers send out m > 1 applications preferably to rms which value their sector specic skills. Unobservable characteristics orthogonal to their skill endowment make some sectors more attractive to a specic worker than others implying that a worker has also preferences over non-wage job characteristics. Thus, she may send an application to a rm in a sector which does not value her specic skills most. More formally, we recur to a discrete choice specication postulating that workers with specic skills in sector k send out an application to a rm in sectors with probability
where λ ≥ 0 drives the intensity of choice and the denominator sums up the exponentials of worker specic productivities in all sectors, respectively.
Workers accept job oers with attached wage oers above their reservation wage w r i . If a worker receives more than one job oer, she chooses the job oer with the highest wage.
Firms
Each sector is populated with N rms. Each rm j's, with j = 1, ...J, labor demand l is xed. Within each sectors there is a share µ > 0 of discriminating rms. A discriminating rm has a dis-utility from hiring a female worker which is modeled with a discrimination coecient d as suggested by Becker (1957) . The rm j residing in sector s has payos calculated as the sum of prots, which are productivities net of wage, minus discrimination costs over all workers n j :
where g = M, F is the gender of the worker. For discrimination costs one has d M = d F = 0 for a non-discriminating rm and d F > 0 for a rm that discriminates against an employed a woman.
Firms set male and female wages to maximize payos. Job oers are sent out including the worker specic wage oers. Then, the rm may face two distinct situations: a) the rm is able to ll all the vacancies as no worker who received a job oer declined it, b) some workers who received a job oer declined it. Firms are facing a trade-o such that higher wage oers increase the likelihood that a vacancy can be lled and becomes productive. Higher wage oers, however, increase the wage bill and depress prots. Firms learn given their past experience on payos made and wage oers made how to best place themselves on this trade-o. To this end, each rm runs regressions of payos per job oer on the wage oers of the past τ iterations. For a positively estimated slope coecientβ, a rm j that resides in sector s will adjust the wage oer w o for a worker coming from sector k and of gender g upwards by a rm specic parameter j in iteration t with respect to the previous iteration t − 1. For a negatively estimated slope coecient the wage is adjusted downwards:
The rm specic adjustment parameter j is drawn from a uniform distribution with bounds [ , ] . Wage oers are adjusted if they are within bounds [0, A].
Policies
An employment quota
We consider an armative action policy where every single rm has to employ at leastσn j women. In order to comply with the quota rms rank applicants by gender and payos. Again, the rm will send binding oers to the best workers taking into account the quota. As it turns out that after the hiring process expired the rm cannot comply, the rm withdraws its previous oers to male workers up to the point where the quota is fullled.
A market for a tradable employment quota
Alternatively, we simulate a market with permits for employing men. In this case, a rm is only allowed to employ as many men as it holds permits for employing male workers. There is a xed number for permits C for the whole economy. Initially every rm gets an equal share of the total number of permits. These permits can be sold and bought at a central clearing agency.
For the clearing agency, we consider a central market maker who collects ask and bid prices, determines the market clearing price in every period and reallocates the permits between the buying and selling rms.
A single rm's oer curve for permits is constructed in the following way.
All unused permits are oered at reservation price zero. The oer of that single rm increases by one more permit at a price equal to the payo of the least protable male worker. The second least protable worker determines the price of yet an additional permit. As we move to even more protable workers the full schedule of the oer curve for that particular rm is derived.
Turning to the demand side the central market maker looks into a single rm that will ask for as many permits as there are more men employed than the rm holds permits currently. Permits are used to employ the most protable male workers in the rm. The bid price for the rst additional permit is the payo of the most protable male worker for whom the rm does not yet have a permit. The bid price for the second additional permit is the payo of the second most protable male worker for whom the rm does not yet have a permit, and so on.
Aggregating up the single rms' supply and demand schedules the market marker constructs the aggregate supply and demand curves for the employment permits. She determines the market clearing price and reallocates the permits from those rms willing to sell at the going price to those willing to purchase permits at the going price. Firms that did not buy the required number of permits to employ all the men whom they made an oer have to revoke from actually employing these men.
Sequencing
The pseudocode outlined in Algorithm 1 gives the timing of the various actions. A particular iteration starts with each rm j posting l vacancies.
Workers apply to rms with a positive number of vacancies, with each worker sending out m applications. Firms evaluate how high their wage oer should be to best optimize on the trade-o of actually attracting workers and not letting the wage bill increase by too much. Firms make binding job oers obeying the non-tradable employment quota including the wage they are willing to pay to the most protable applicants. Workers choose the job with the best wage oer conditional on it being above their individual specic reservation wage. Firms that were not able to hire enough women to fulll the quota withdraw their oers to male workers.
For the case where we are looking into an economy with a tradable employment quota rms observe how many workers they are able to attract and compare their stock of permits with the number of male workers willing to work for them. Each rm draws its individual supply and demand schedule for the permits. The market maker aggregates these up and determines the market clearing price at which the permits are reallocated between rms.
Firms not able to purchase the required number of permits for all the men who wanted to work for them withdraw their oers to the least protable men.
Finally, the rms produce and observe their payos. At the end of each iteration all workers are dismissed and the cycle restarts.
3 Simulation set-up
Parametrization
In order to be able to compare the results from our simulation model with the outcomes form already existing analytical models we, rst, set-up a simplied version with one sector only. Then we extend this model to ve sectors.
For the multi-sector version we simulate two policy scenarios with two different labor markets. First we look into an armative action policy which prescribes every single rm to employ at least 30% women. Then, we introduce a tradable employment quota. To this end 100 permits are equally distributed among the rms initially which then can be traded at a central- 
Dierence-in-dierence approach
A simple comparison of a tradable with a non-tradable quota would yield awed results with respect to their labor market eects. Only if it was possible to issue the number of permits which exactly matches the restrictions that rms are facing from a uniformly applied quota the two policies would be comparable. However, as overall employment and the structure of employment by gender are endogenous, this particular number of permits which makes the policies comparable cannot be determined in advance.
As a solution we apply a dierence-in-dierence approach to analyze the policy eects in comparison. The procedure will be to compare the difference of the variables of interest arising from a non-tradable employment quota comparing an equal with and un-equal distribution of female labor supply across sectors, with the dierence between the same variables under a tradable employment quota. Denote with v the labor market variable of interest, with ntq the policy of a non-tradable employment quota, with tq the tradable employment quota, and with eqF emDis whether female workers are equally or unequally (U neqF emDis) distributed across sectors. Then, the policy eect T writes:
Baseline scenarios without policy
One sector set-up
We start o with the one-sector version of our model without policy intervention comparing labor markets with and without discriminating rms. The simulation results are shown using box plots drawing on the 100 observations for each treatment as explained in the simulation set-up.
Figure 1 (a) shows the employment rates when there are no discriminating rms and, alternatively, when every second rm discriminates against women.
Overall employment rates and employment rates by gender are equal for the non-discriminating scenario as it should be. Allowing for discriminating rms reduces overall employment with respect to the reference scenario where we only have non-disutility rms. The decrease in overall employment is driven by a sharp decline in female employment which, moreover, falls short of male employment. Turning to wages, see panel (b), reveals that female workers are paid less than male workers as we allow for disutility rms.
Both, the employment and the wage eects, can be explained by the increase in the relative demand for male workers as discriminating rms are introduced. These rms have a distaste for female workers making competition for male workers ercer. Consequently, male workers' wages increase and female wages decline. Although there is upward pressure on male wages, on average these wages are only slightly higher than in the non-disutility case because those men with relatively high reservation wages will enter the labor market now. By the same token, female employment is driven down as some women will withdraw from the labor market as the going wages have fallen below their reservation wage.
Disentangling the employment eects when we have 50% discriminating rms into the employment ratios for those rms that discriminate and those that do not discriminate yields Figure 1 (c) . The discriminating rms have overall lower employment than the non-discriminating rms because they hire less women than men and the gender employment gap is larger at discriminatory rms than at non-discriminatory rms. Due to taste discrimination women earn lower wages at discriminatory rms than men. But there is also a small gender wage dierential at non-discriminating rms as these rms face a relatively larger female supply.
Overall these simulations are in line with the ndings of the existing literature on taste discrimination in search models of the labor market. As in Kaas (2009) and Kaas and Lu (2010) the simplied version of our simulation model generates employment segregation. The non-discriminating rms employ more women than men and the discriminating rms employ substantially more men. Comparable to Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) wages for women are lower than those for men. Moreover, we can relate to the search and matching model with heterogeneous reservation wages by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) who argue for the emergence of a wage dispersion in such frameworks. The wage dispersion generated by our model is exemplied in Figure 8 panels (a) to (d). We plot the wages paid by gender and by rm type for a single run at iteration 1,000 for all workers employed. There is no single market wage, neither by gender nor by the type of rm. 
Results
The welfare eects of the two policies using the dierence-in-dierence approach from equation (5) can be seen in Table 3 . We dene welfare as the sum of all wages paid in the economy and all payos accruing to rms. The third row of Table 3 shows a decline in welfare as we move from a labor market with an equal distribution of women across sectoral skills to an un-equal distribution applying a non-tradable employment quota of 40.021 units.
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Welfare also decreases for a tradable employment quota as we make the distribution of women over sectors unequal by 13.433. However, the decline is smaller so that the comparison of the welfare losses between the two policies (26.589) speaks for a tradable employment quota as the superior policy instrument.
5 These units may be interpreted in relation to total possible output in this economy. With 1,000 workers and a maximum per worker productivity of 2, the maximum of total units possible to produce in this economy is 2,000. Measured welfare falls short of this upper bound due to labor market frictions leaving vacancies unlled, the allocation of workers to sectors where their productivity does not fully unfold, and the discriminatory behavior of rms. What stands behind these ndings? Let us rst look into the functioning of the permit market. Figure 5 shows a snapshot of the supply and demand schedules that the market maker is facing at a particular iteration given the decisions of all the rms how many permits to sell and buy for the labor market with an unequal distribution of women across sectoral skills. The downward sloping market demand stems from aggregating up the individual rms' demands for permits given prices. Similarly the upward sloping supply is the sum of permits rms are willing to sell at given prices. As explained earlier, the market maker chooses the price where supply and demand schedules cross and reallocates the permits from those willing to sell at the market clearing price to those rms willing to buy. Table 3 ).
The drop in employment is less pronounced for the tradable quota as one moves from an equal to an unequal distribution of women across sectors if compared to the non-tradable quota. Without permits a rm wanting to produce may be constrained by the employment quota. There is a vacancy to be lled, and while there is no female applicant to ll the vacancy, a male worker would be willing to accept the job oer. However, the rm cannot employ him because the employment quota has to be obeyed. A tradable employment quota gives rms facing such a situation more exibility.
They may purchase a permit allowing them to employ an additional man, and they will do so as long as the additional male worker's protability covers the price of the permit. Thus, more vacancies can actually become productive with a tradable employment quota when female (and male) labor supply is distributed unequally as reected in the non-decline of the male employment rate for the tradable quota. The increase in the employment rate also explains the eect of a tradable employment quota on payos as an otherwise unproductive vacancy is lled now, without an increase in the average wage rate.
Extensions and robustness
Besides making female labor supply unequal across sectors, one may argue that the share of discriminating rms is also unequally distributed across sectors. One could imagine that discrimination already unfolds as young women make their human capital investment decisions avoiding the acquisi-tion of skills for sectors which are known to host rms having a taste for men.
In such a scenario, the share of women and the share of discriminating rms would be negatively correlated across sectors. A version of our simulation model along these lines yields qualitatively similar results, i.e. a tradable employment quota is welfare improving.
In addition to the aforementioned extension of the simulation analysis we ran a series of robustness tests involving changes of the key parameters of our model. We were interested in whether our main result on the di-in-di eect on welfare survives. To this end we combined the two key policy pa- We propose and analyze a exible quota solution. As we argue, a tradable employment quota gives rms additional exibility to hire men if female labor supply is insucient. By issuing permits to rms allowing them to hire men and making these permits tradable across rms, rms in shortage of women will not be forced to abandon output. Rather they will try to purchase a permit that allows them to hire a man up to the point where this additional man's protability covers the costs of the permit. Equally, we will have rms in this market that will nd it protable to sell permits as they can easily ll their vacancies with women. An advantage of a tradable permit system is that it allows for a exible adjustment at the rm level without having to compromise on the overall policy goal to achieve a certain share of female employment in the labor market. The scope of female employment in the economy can be managed at the aggregate level by issuing or withdrawing permits.
For analyzing the labor market eects of a tradable employment quota we developed an agent-based labor market model of heterogeneous workers and several sectors, hosting rms that may taste discriminate against women.
The choice of a computational technique to analyze the policy proposal was motivated by our aim to show that a permit system may work in a realistic market context. Our simulation results suggest that a market for a tradable employment quota may emerge, and that a more exible policy solution is actually improving welfare.
Although we did make an eort to implement features of the labor and permit market in considerable detail, we have been silent about the occupational or regional scope of a permit system. Given our discussion in the introduction on the recent moves to make shares of female workers legally binding for boards of rms, one may at rst think of a permit market for that segment. In principle, however, we believe that a tradable employment quota would also work for other groups of occupations, may it be introduced nationally or for a set of countries as the European Union.
This brings us to our last point, i.e. the odds that a system of permit trading nds political support. We try to shed light on this question by, once more, drawing analogies to the case of environmental policies. Stavins (1998) presents an insightful discussion on how the main parties involved proted from a command-and-control environmental policy and had reasons to oppose a tradable permit system. Similar arguments may apply for a tradable employment quota. A crispy, xed employment quota may be easier for politicians to communicate to the public which matters for symbolic politics.
Moreover, assuming voters have limited information, once xed regulations are introduced, rms and politicians can agree upon mutually benecial ex-emptions. The fact, that employment quotas have been introduced for a small segment of the labor market, very often for boards of publicly listed companies only, may evidence such a line of reasoning. It is also reported, that environmental interest groups were hostile towards market-based instruments in the beginning. One could imagine, that this could also become the fate of a tradable employment quota. But opposition to a market-based instrument may also arise for less philosophical reasons. Bureaucracies and legislators trained in law may lose expertise, and even control as implementation of the armative action policy is left to largely private decisions with a permit system. Thus, there are many reasons to expect that an armative action policy based on tradable permits will never be implemented. This is the more pessimistic outlook. A more optimistic outlook has a glance at the trading places for pollution rights in Chicago, Leipzig and other cities around the globe. 
